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Abstract This paper is concerned with the problem of ranking Lorenz curves in
situations where the Lorenz curves intersect and no unambiguous ranking can
be attained without introducing weaker ranking criteria than first-degree Lorenz
dominance. To deal with such situations, Aaberge (Soc Choice Welf 33:235–259,
2009) introduced two alternative sequences of nested dominance criteria for Lorenz
curves, which proved to characterize two separate systems of nested subfamilies of
inequality measures. This paper uses the obtained characterization results to arrange
the members of two different generalized Gini families of inequality measures into
subfamilies according to their relationship to Lorenz dominance of various degrees.
Since the various criteria of higher degree Lorenz dominance provide convenient
computational methods, these results can be used to identify the largest subfamily
of the generalized Gini families, and thus the least restrictive social preferences,
required to reach unambiguous ranking of a set of Lorenz curves. We further
show that the weight-functions of the members of the generalized Gini families
offer intuitive interpretations of higher degree Lorenz dominance, which generally
has been viewed as difficult to interpret because they involve assumptions about
third and higher derivatives. To demonstrate the usefulness of these methods for
empirical applications, we examine the time trend in income and earnings inequality
of Norwegian males during the period 1967–2005.
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1 Introduction
Ranking Lorenz curves in accordance with first-degree Lorenz dominance means
that the higher of two non-intersecting Lorenz curves is preferred. The normative
significance of this criterion follows from the fact that the higher of two non-
intersecting Lorenz curves can be obtained from the lower Lorenz curve by means of
rank-preserving income transfers from richer to poorer individuals, which means that
the criterion of first-degree Lorenz dominance is consistent with the Pigou-Dalton
principle of transfers. When one Lorenz curve lies above another Lorenz curve,
the higher Lorenz curve therefore displays less inequality than the lower Lorenz
curve. However, since Lorenz curves may intersect, which is often the case in applied
research, weaker ranking criteria than first-degree Lorenz dominance are required.
Although the theoretical literature offers more general dominance criteria for
ranking intersecting Lorenz curves,1 these methods are generally viewed as hard
to implement and the results difficult to interpret because they involve assumptions
about third and higher derivatives (see e.g. [10, 11]). Thus, most empirical studies rely
exclusively on one or a few summary measures of inequality to achieve rankings of
intersecting Lorenz curves. A concern is, however, that the conclusions reached are
sensitive to the more or less arbitrary choice of inequality measures. It is, therefore,
due time to start bridging the wide gap between the theoretical and the empirical
strand of the literature concerned with rankings of intersecting Lorenz curves. That
is the focus of this paper.
General Lorenz dominance criteria As demonstrated by Aaberge [5] two alterna-
tive dominance criteria emerge as attractive generalizations of first-degree Lorenz
dominance; one that integrates the Lorenz curve from below (second-degree upward
Lorenz dominance) and the other that integrates the Lorenz curve from above
(second-degree downward Lorenz dominance). Since first-degree Lorenz dominance
implies second-degree upward as well as downward Lorenz dominance, it follows
that both methods preserve first-degree Lorenz dominance and thus are consistent
with the Pigou–Dalton principle of transfers.
However, the transfer sensitivity of these criteria differs. While second-degree
upward Lorenz dominance places more emphasis on transfers occurring in the lower
part of the income distribution, second-degree downward Lorenz dominance is more
sensitive to transfers that occur in the upper part of the income distribution. This
means that the criterion of second-degree upward Lorenz dominance requires a
transfer of money from a richer to a poorer person to be more equalizing the lower
it occurs in the income distribution, provided that the proportion of individuals
between the donors and receivers is fixed. By contrast, the criterion of second-degree
downward Lorenz dominance requires this type of transfer to be more equalizing the
higher it occurs in the income distribution.
For situations where neither upward nor downward Lorenz dominance of second-
degree provide unambiguous rankings of Lorenz curves, Aaberge [5] introduced two
hierarchical sequences of Lorenz dominance criteria, and moreover, explored what
1See e.g. Kolm [21], Shorrocks and Foster [25], Davies and Hoy [15], Zoli [30] and Aaberge [1, 5].
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restrictions various Lorenz dominance criteria place on the weight-functions of the
general Mehran–Yaari family of rank-dependent measures of inequality. In addition,
by introducing general principles of transfer sensitivity, Aaberge [5] demonstrated
that these criteria can be given a normative justification.
Inequality measures approach An alternative and more common strategy for
achieving rankings of intersecting Lorenz curves is to apply the Gini coefficient.
However, since no single measure can reflect all aspects of inequality exhibited by the
Lorenz curve, the importance of using alternative measures to the Gini coefficient is
universally acknowledged.
As proposed by Mehran [22], we may use weighed sums of the income share devi-
ations as alternative rank-dependent measures of inequality to the Gini coefficient.
The Mehran–Yaari family of rank-dependent measures of inequality, which includes
the Gini coefficient, can alternatively be expressed as a weighted area between
the Lorenz curve (L(u)) and its equality reference (u). The chosen specification
of the rank-dependent weight-function, which may be considered as the preference
function of a social planner, clarifies whether concern about inequality is particularly
related to the lower, the central or the upper part of the income distribution. Thus,
the functional form of the weight-function exhibits the inequality aversion profile
of the corresponding measure of inequality. Roughly speaking, we may say that a
rank-dependent measure of inequality exhibits downside inequality aversion when
the weight-function gives more emphasis to the deviation between the Lorenz curve
and its equality reference, u–L(u), for small u than for large u. By contrast, when the
weight-function gives more weight to the deviation u–L(u) for large u than for small
u, we may say that the corresponding inequality measure exhibits upside inequality
aversion.
Theoretical contributions The purpose of the theoretical part of this paper is to
explore what restrictions various Lorenz dominance criteria place on the weight-
functions of two alternative generalized Gini families of rank-dependent measures of
inequality, as well as to provide a normative justification of these criteria by relying
on appropriate general principles of transfer sensitivity introduced by Aaberge
[5]. As is demonstrated by Aaberge [5], second-degree Lorenz dominance forms a
natural basis for the construction of two separate hierarchical sequences dominance
criteria: one sequence places emphasis on changes that occur in the lower part
of the Lorenz curve, whereas the other places emphasis on changes that occur in
the upper part of the Lorenz curve. Both sequences of dominance criteria turn
out to depart from the Gini coefficient. In particular, one requires higher degree
of downside inequality aversion and the other higher degree of upside inequality
aversion than what is exhibited by the Gini coefficient. This means that the Gini
coefficient in general favors neither the lower nor the upper part of the Lorenz
curves. In Section 2, we make two theoretical contributions. We first show that if we
restrict the ranking problem to Lorenz curves with equal Gini coefficients, second-
degree upward and downward dominance coincide in the sense that a Lorenz curve
L1 that second-degree upward dominates a Lorenz curve L2 is always second-degree
downward dominated by L2. Secondly, we characterize the relationship between
ordering conditions for the Gini coefficient and the general family of rank-dependent
measures of inequality, in the case of singly intersecting Lorenz curves.
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As shown by Aaberge [5], the hierarchical and nested structure of the domi-
nance criteria allows us to identify the lowest degree of dominance required to
reach unambiguous rankings of Lorenz curves. In Section 3, we characterize the
relationship between Lorenz dominance criteria of various degree and alternative
rank-dependent measures of inequality. By doing so, we connect the dominance and
the inequality measures approach to the ranking of intersecting Lorenz curves. In
particular, we show how the members of two different generalized Gini families of
inequality measures can be divided into subfamilies according to their relationship
to Lorenz dominance of various degrees. These subfamilies of inequality measures
offer different inequality aversion profiles: one exhibits successively higher degrees
of downside inequality aversion, whereas the other exhibits successively higher
degrees of upside inequality aversion. Since the criteria of Lorenz dominance provide
convenient computational methods, these results can be used to identify the largest
subfamily of the generalized Gini families, and thus the least restrictive social
preferences, required to reach unambiguous ranking of any given set of Lorenz
curves. And from the weight-functions of these inequality measures, we obtain
intuitive interpretations of higher degree Lorenz dominance, which generally has
been viewed as difficult to interpret.
Empirical application The evolution of earnings and income inequality in devel-
oped countries over the last few decades is one of the most extensively researched
topics in economics. In a widely cited review of the literature, Gottschalk and
Smeeding [18] conclude that earnings and income inequality increased in most
OECD countries during the 1980s and early 1990s. Moreover, they argue that
many countries with fairly low levels of inequality experienced some of the largest
increases in inequality. These conclusions rest on numerous empirical studies relying
exclusively on one or a few summary measures of inequality, like the Gini coefficient.
A concern is, however, that the conclusions reached are sensitive to the more or less
arbitrary choice of inequality measure.
Section 4 examines the time trend in income and earnings inequality of Norwegian
males during the period 1967–2005, showing how the dominance approach and the
inequality measures approach can be combined in a coherent way in empirical
analysis. First, we identify the lowest degree of dominance, and hence the least
restrictive social preferences, required to reach unambiguous rankings of the Lorenz
curves over this period. Second, we pin down the largest subfamily of the generalized
Gini families that is consistent with the actual ranking of these Lorenz curves. Finally,
to ease the interpretation of the inequality aversion exhibited in the dominance
results, we compute the weight-functions of these inequality measures.
2 The relationship between Lorenz dominance and the Gini coefficient
The Lorenz curve L for a cumulative income distribution F with mean μ is defined by
L(u) = 1
μ
u∫
0
F−1(t)dt, 0 ≤ u ≤ 1, (1)
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where F−1(t) = inf {x : F(x) ≥ t} is the left inverse of F. Thus, the Lorenz curve
L(u) shows the share of total income received by the poorest 100 u per cent of the
population.
Under the restriction of equal mean incomes, the problem of ranking Lorenz
curves formally corresponds to the problem of choosing between uncertain
prospects. This relationship has been utilized by Atkinson [9] to characterize the
criterion of non-intersecting Lorenz curves in the case of distributions with equal
mean incomes. This was motivated by the fact that in cases of equal mean incomes the
criterion of non-intersecting Lorenz curves is equivalent to second-degree stochastic
dominance,2 which means that the criterion of non-intersecting Lorenz curves obeys
the Pigou–Dalton principle of transfers. The Pigou–Dalton principle of transfers
states that an income transfer from a richer to a poorer individual reduces income
inequality, provided that their ranks in the income distribution are unchanged.
To perform inequality comparisons with Lorenz curves we can deal with distrib-
utions with equal means, or alternatively simply abandon the assumption of equal
means and consider distributions of relative incomes. The latter approach normally
forms the basis of empirical studies of income inequality.
The standard ranking criterion of non-intersecting Lorenz curves, called f irst-
degree Lorenz dominance, is based on the following definition,3
Definition 2.1 A Lorenz curve L1 is said to first-degree dominate a Lorenz curve L2 if
L1(u) ≥ L2(u) f or all u ∈ [0, 1]
and the inequality holds strictly for some u ∈ 〈0, 1〉.
A social planner who prefers the dominating one of non-intersecting Lorenz
curves favors transfers of incomes which reduce the differences between the income
shares of the donor and the recipient, and is therefore said to be inequality averse.
In order to examine the relationship between various Lorenz dominance criteria
and the measurement of inequality, we will rely on the family of rank-dependent
measures of inequality,4 defined by
JP(L) = 1 −
1∫
0
P′(u)d L(u) = 1 − 1
μ
1∫
0
P′(u)F−1(u) du, (2)
where L is the Lorenz curve of the income distribution F with mean μ, and the
weight-function P′ is the derivative of a continuous, differentiable and concave
function P defined on the unit interval where P(0) = 0 and P(1) = 1. To ensure
2For a proof, see Hardy et al. [19] or Atkinson [9].
3Note that most analyses of Lorenz dominance apply a definition that excludes the requirement of
strict inequality for some u.
4Mehran [22] introduced the JP-family by relying on descriptive arguments. For alternative norma-
tive motivations of the JP-family and various subfamilies of the JP-family we refer to Donaldson and
Weymark [16], Weymark [26], Yaari [28] and Aaberge [2].
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that JP has the unit interval as its range, the condition P′(1) = 0 is imposed on
P. As demonstrated by Yaari [27, 28] and Aaberge [2], the JP-family represents a
preference relation defined either on the class of distribution functions (F) or on the
class of Lorenz curves (L), where P can be interpreted as a preference function of
a social planner. The preference function P assigns weights to the incomes of the
individuals in accordance with their rank in the income distribution. Therefore, the
functional form of P reveals the attitude towards inequality of a social planner who
employs JP to judge between Lorenz curves. The most well-known member of the
JP-family is the Gini coefficient, which is obtained by inserting for P(u) = 2u − u2
in (2).
As demonstrated by Yaari [28], the JP-family of inequality measures characterizes
the condition of first-degree Lorenz dominance when the functional form of the
preference function P is strictly concave. This means that JP satisfies the Pigou–
Dalton principle of transfers for concave P-functions. To deal with situations where
Lorenz curves intersect a weaker principle than first-degree Lorenz dominance is
called for. To this end, researchers regularly employ second-degree upward Lorenz
dominance, defined by
Definition 2.2 A Lorenz curve L1 is said to second-degree upward dominate a
Lorenz curve L2 if
u∫
0
L1(t)dt ≥
u∫
0
L2(t)dt f or all u ∈ [0, 1]
and the inequality holds strictly for some u ∈ 〈0, 1〉.
The term upward dominance refers to the fact that the Lorenz curves are inte-
grated from below.5 The integrated Lorenz curve can be considered as a sum of
weighted income shares, where the weights decrease linearly with increasing rank
of the income receiver in the income distribution. Thus, a social planner who prefers
the second-degree upward dominating of two intersecting Lorenz curves pays more
attention to inequality in the lower than in the upper part of the income distribution.
As proposed by Aaberge [5], an alternative ranking criterion to second-degree
upward Lorenz dominance can be obtained by integrating the Lorenz curve from
above.
Definition 2.3 A Lorenz curve L1 is said to second-degree downward dominate a
Lorenz curve L2 if
1∫
u
(1 − L1(t)) dt ≤
1∫
u
(1 − L2(t)) dt f or all u ∈ [0, 1]
and the inequality holds strictly for some u ∈ 〈0, 1〉.
5Note that second-degree upward Lorenz dominance is equivalent to a normalized version of third-
degree inverse stochastic dominance introduced by Muliere and Scarsini [23].
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Note that both downward and upward Lorenz dominance of second degree pre-
serve first-degree Lorenz dominance, since first-degree Lorenz dominance implies
second-degree upward as well as second-degree downward Lorenz dominance. Con-
sequently, both dominance criteria are consistent with the Pigou–Dalton principle
of transfers. The choice between second-degree upward and downward Lorenz
dominance clarifies whether or not equalizing transfers between poorer individuals
should be considered more important than those between richer individuals.
As recognized by Muliere and Scarsini [23], there is no simple relationship be-
tween third-degree stochastic dominance and third-degree upward inverse stochastic
dominance. Thus, since second-degree upward Lorenz dominance is equivalent to
third-degree upward inverse stochastic dominance, a general characterization of
second-degree Lorenz dominance (or third-degree inverse stochastic dominance) in
terms of ordering conditions for the utilitarian measures introduced by Kolm [20]
and Atkinson [9] cannot be obtained. As demonstrated by Aaberge [5], however,
the family of rank-dependent measures of inequality, defined by (2), turns out to
form a convenient basis for judging the normative significance of second-degree and
higher degrees of Lorenz dominance.
To judge the normative significance of criteria for ranking intersecting Lorenz
curves, more powerful principles than the Pigou–Dalton principle of transfers are
needed. To this end, Kolm [21] introduced the principle of diminishing transfers,
which for a fixed difference in income considers a transfer from a richer to a poorer
person to be more equalizing the further down in the income distribution it takes
place.6 As indicated by Shorrocks and Foster [25] and Muliere and Scarsini [23],
the principle of diminishing transfers is, however, not consistent with second-degree
upward Lorenz dominance. However, Mehran [22] introduced an alternative version
of the principle of diminishing transfers by accounting for the difference in the pro-
portion of individuals between donors and recipients of the income transfers, rather
than for the difference in income. This principle, denoted first-degree downside
positional transfer sensitivity (DPTS) by Aaberge [5], proves to characterize second-
degree upward Lorenz dominance. By contrast, a social planner who considers a
given transfer of money from a richer to a poorer person to be more equalizing
the higher it occurs in the income distribution, provided that the proportions of
the population located between the receivers and the donors are equal, favors the
principle of first-degree upside positional transfer sensitivity (UPTS). The UPTS
characterizes second-degree downward Lorenz dominance. To ensure equivalence
between second-degree downward Lorenz dominance and JP-measures as decision
criteria, Aaberge [5] proved that it is necessary to restrict the preference functions P
to be concave with negative third derivatives.7 By contrast, the condition of positive
third derivative of P yields second-degree upward dominance.
An inequality averse social planner who supports the criterion of second-degree
upward Lorenz dominance will act in line with the principle of first-degree DPTS
and assign more weight to changes that take place in the lower part of the Lorenz
curve than to changes that occur in the upper part of the Lorenz curve. By contrast,
6For a formal definition, see Kolm [21].
7Aaberge [1] demonstrated that JP defined by (2) satisfies Kolm’s principle of diminishing transfers
under conditions that depend on the shape of the preference function P as well as on the shape of
the income distribution F.
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the criterion of second-degree downward Lorenz dominance emphasizes changes
that occur in the upper part of the Lorenz curve. Thus, an inequality averse social
planner who employs the criterion of second-degree downward Lorenz dominance
acts in favor of the Pigou–Dalton principle of transfers and the principle of first-
degree UPTS.
Since the third derivative of the P-function that corresponds to the Gini coefficient
is always equal to 0, the Gini coefficient neither preserves second-degree upward
Lorenz dominance nor second-degree downward Lorenz dominance, except for the
case when the inequality in Definitions 2.3A and 2.3B holds strictly for u = 1 and
u = 0, respectively.8 Thus, the suggestion of Muliere and Scarsini [23] that the Gini
coefficient is coherent with second-degree upward Lorenz dominance requires a
definition of second-degree Lorenz dominance that abandons the condition of strict
inequality (for some u ∈ 〈0, 1〉). However, by assuming that the Lorenz curves cross
only once the following results hold.9
Proposition 2.1A Assume that L1 and L2 are singly intersecting Lorenz curves and
L1 crosses L2 initially from above, and let G(L1) and G (L2) be the two corresponding
Gini coef f icients. Then the following statements are equivalent,
(i) JP(L1) < JP(L2) for all P such that P′(u) > 0, P′′(u) < 0 and P′′′(u) > 0
for all u ∈ (0, 1)
(ii) G(L1) ≤ G(L2).
(Proof in Appendix).
Proposition 2.1B Assume that L1 and L2 are singly intersecting Lorenz curves and
L2 crosses L1 initially from above, and let G(L1) and G(L2) be the two corresponding
Gini coef f icients. Then the following statements are equivalent,
(i) JP(L1) < JP(L2) for all P such that P′(u) > 0, P′′(u) < 0 and P′′′(u) < 0
for all u ∈ (0, 1)
(ii) G(L1) ≤ G(L2).
The proof of Proposition 2.1B can be achieved by following the line of reasoning
used in the proof of Proposition 2.1A. Note that Proposition 2.1A can be considered
as a dual version of the results of Shorrocks and Foster [25] and Dardanoni and
Lambert [14], which clarify the relationship between third-degree (upward) stochas-
tic dominance, ordering conditions for the coefficient of variation and transfer sen-
sitive measures of inequality. Proposition 2.2 gives results for the case of equal Gini
coefficients. In this case, second-degree upward and downward Lorenz dominance
“coincide” in the sense that a Lorenz curve L1 that second-degree upward dominates
a Lorenz curve L2 will always be second-degree downward dominated by L2. Thus,
8Aaberge [1] gave an alternative interpretation of this property by demonstrating that the Gini
coefficient attaches an equal weight to a given transfer irrespective of where it takes place in
the income distribution, as long as the income transfer occurs between individuals with the same
difference in ranks.
9Zoli [30] provided a result similar to Proposition 2.1A for singly intersecting generalized Lorenz
curves under the condition of equal means.
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L1 can be attained from L2 by transfers that obey the principle of first-degree DPTS,
whereas L2 can be attained from L1 by transfers that obey the principle of first-
degree UPTS.
Proposition 2.2 Let L1 and L2 be Lorenz curves with equal Gini coef f icients. Then
the following statements are equivalent,
(i) L1 second-degree upward dominates L2
(ii) L2 second-degree downward dominates L1
(iii) JP (L1) < JP (L2) for all P with P′(u) > 0 and P′′(u) < 0 being such that JP
obeys the principle of f irst-degree DPTS.
(iv) JP (L2) < JP (L1) for all P with P′(u) > 0 and P′′(u) < 0 being such that JP
obeys the principle of f irst-degree UPTS.
(Proof in Appendix).
3 The relationship between general criteria of Lorenz dominance and generalized
Gini families of inequality measures
To deal with situations where second-degree (upward or downward) Lorenz domi-
nance does not provide unambiguous ranking of Lorenz curves, Aaberge [5] intro-
duced two hierarchical sequences of nested Lorenz dominance criteria that proved to
divide the family of rank-dependent measures of inequality (2) into two correspond-
ing hierarchical systems of nested subfamilies. In this section, we use these results
to divide two generalized Gini families of rank-dependent measures of inequality
into two corresponding hierarchical systems of nested subfamilies that offer different
inequality aversion profiles: one exhibits successively higher degrees of downside
inequality aversion (satisfies higher degrees of DPTS), whereas the other exhibits
successively higher degrees of upside inequality aversion (satisfies higher degrees of
UPTS). Note that the motivation for introducing the principles of DPTS (UPTS) was
to successively strengthen the emphasis of transfers taking place in the lower (higher)
part of the income distribution. As explained in Aaberge [5], the degree of aversion
to downside inequality increases with the degree of upward Lorenz dominance. A
similar relationship holds between downward Lorenz dominance and aversion to
upside inequality aversion. The highest degree of downside inequality aversion is
achieved when focus is exclusively on the situation of the worst-off income recipient.
Thus, the JP-measure that is obtained as the preference function approaches
Pd(t) =
{
0, t = 0
1, 0 < t ≤ 1, (3)
can be considered as the JP-measure that exhibits the highest degree of downside
inequality aversion. Inserting (3) in (2) yields
JPd(L) = 1 −
F−1(0+)
μ
. (4)
Hence, the inequality measure JPd corresponds to the Rawlsian maximin criterion. As
JPd is compatible with the limiting case of upward Lorenz dominance, the Rawlsian
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(relative) maximin criterion preserves all degrees of upward Lorenz dominance and
rejects downward Lorenz dominance.
By contrast, the JP-measure that is obtained as P approaches10
Pu(t) =
{
1, 0 ≤ t < 1
0, t = 1, (5)
exhibits the highest degree of upside inequality aversion. Inserting (5) in (2) yields
JPu(L) = 1 +
F−1(1)
μ
. (6)
Thus, JPu , which we will denote the relative minimax criterion, is “dual” to the
Rawlsian (relative) maximin criterion in the sense that it is compatible with the
limiting case of downward Lorenz dominance. When the comparison of Lorenz
curves is based on the relative minimax criterion, the preferred Lorenz curve is the
one for which the largest relative income is smallest. The only transfers that decrease
inequality are those from the richest unit to anyone else.
As will be demonstrated below, the extreme inequality aversion measure (4)
is associated with the extended Gini family of inequality measures introduced by
Donaldson and Weymark [16] and Yitzhaki [29]. This family is defined by
Gk(L) = 1 − k (k + 1)
1∫
0
(1 − u)k−1 L(u) du = 1 − (k + 1)
μ
∞∫
0
(1 − u)k F−1(u)du, k ≥ 1.
(7)
In order to introduce an alternative “generalized” Gini family of inequality mea-
sures, Aaberge [1, 4] draws on the practice from the statistical literature as motivation
for using the moments of the Lorenz curve as a basis for defining the Lorenz family
of inequality measures11
Dk(L) = 1 − (k + 1)
1∫
0
uk−1 L(u)du = 1 − k + 1
μk
∞∫
0
(
1 − uk) F−1(u)du, k = 1, 2, . . . ,
(8)
which is associated with the relative minimax criterion (6). Note that D1 = G1 is
equal to the Gini coefficient. As was demonstrated by Aaberge [4], the Lorenz family
of inequality measures {Dk : k = 1, 2, . . .} uniquely determines the Lorenz curve.
Thus, we can, without loss of information, restrict the examination of inequality in
an income distribution F to the family {Dk : k = 1, 2, . . .} of inequality measures.
As shown by the following expression
Gk(L) = 1 + (k + 1)
k∑
j=1
(−1) j
(
k
j
)
j
j + 1
(
1 − Dj(L)
)
, k = 1, 2, . . . . (9)
10Note that the normalization condition P’(0) = 1 is ignored in this case.
11The Lorenz family of inequality measures proves to be a subclass of the “illfare-ranked single-series
Ginis” discussed by Donaldson and Weymark [16] and Bossert [12].
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there is a one-to-one correspondence between the Lorenz family and the integer
subfamily {Gk(L) : k = 1, 2, . . .} of the extended Gini family of inequality mea-
sures. Moreover, the extended Gini subfamily {Gk(L) : k = 1, 2, . . . , r} is uniquely
determined by the corresponding Lorenz subfamily {Dk(L) : k = 1, 2, . . . , r} for any
integer r. Note that expressions (7) and (8) show that as k increases, Gk places more
weight on changes in the lower part of the Lorenz curve, while Dk places more weight
on changes in the upper part of the Lorenz curve.
Based on Theorems 3.1A, 3.1B, 3.2A and 3.2B in Aaberge [5], we will now
demonstrate how the various Lorenz dominance criteria can be applied to evaluate
the ranking properties of the Lorenz and the extended Gini families of inequality
measures. Note that {Gk : k > 0} is a subfamily of JP formed by the following family
of P-functions,
P1k(t) = 1 − (1 − t)k+1, k ≥ 0. (10)
Differentiating P1k defined by (10), we find that
P( j)1k (t) =
⎧⎨
⎩
(−1) j−1 (k + 1)!
(k − j + 1)! (1 − t)
k− j+1, j = 1, 2, ..., k + 1
0 , j = k + 2, k + 3, . . .
(11)
As can be observed from (11), the weight function P1k of the extended Gini family of
inequality measures is a member of the family P∗1i (and P
∗∗
1i ) in Aaberge [5] for k = i,
i + 1,.... Thus, we get the following result from Theorem 3.2A of Aaberge [5],12
Proposition 3.1 Let L1 and L2 be members of L. Then
(i) L1ith-degree upward dominates L2
implies
(ii) Gk (L1) < Gk (L2) f or k = i, i + 1, i + 2, . . .
Equation (11) implies that P′′1k(t) < 0 for all t ∈ 〈0, 1〉 when k > 0 and thus that the
Gk-measures satisfy the Pigou–Dalton principle of transfers for k > 0. Moreover,
P′′′1k (t) > 0 for all t ∈ 〈0, 1〉 when k > 1. Hence all Gk for k > 1 preserve second-
degree upward Lorenz dominance. Further, the derivatives of Pk alternate in sign
up to the (k + 1)th derivative and P( j)1k (1) = 0 for all j ≤ k. Thus, it follows from
Theorem 3.2A of Aaberge [5] that Gk preserves upward Lorenz dominance of
degree k and obeys the principles of DPTS up to and including (k − 1)th degree.
The highest degree of downside inequality averse behavior occurs as k → ∞, which
corresponds to the inequality averse behavior of the Rawlsian (relative) maximin
criterion. Thus, Gk satisfies all degrees of upward Lorenz dominance as k → ∞. At
the other extreme, as k = 0, the preference function P0(t) = t, which means that JP0
does not obey the Pigou–Dalton principle of transfers or any principle of DPTS. The
stated properties of the Gk-measures are summarized in the following proposition,
12Muliere and Scarsini [23] gave an alternative proof of Proposition 3.1.
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Proposition 3.2 The extended Gini family of inequality measures def ined by (7) has
the following properties,
(i) Gk preserves upward Lorenz dominance of degree k and all degrees lower
than k.
(ii) Gk obeys the Pigou–Dalton principle of transfers for k > 0, and the principles of
DPTS up to and including (k − 1)th degree for k > 1.
(iii) The sequence {Gk} approaches 0 as k → 0.
(iv) The sequence {Gk} approaches the Rawlsian relative maximin criterion as
k → ∞.
As demonstrated by Aaberge [1], the Lorenz family of inequality measures is a
subfamily of JP formed by the following family of P-functions,
P2k(t) = 1k
(
(k + 1) t − tk+1) , k = 1, 2, . . . (12)
Differentiating P2k defined by (12) yields
P( j)2k (t) =
⎧⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
k + 1
k
(1 − tk), , j = 1
− (k + 1) (k − 1) (k − 2) .... (k − j + 2) tk− j+1 , j = 2, 3, ..., k + 1
0 , j = k + 2, k + 3, . . .
(13)
By noting from (13) that the weight-function P2k of the Lorenz family of inequality
measures is a member of the family P∗2i in Aaberge [5] for k = i, i + 1,. . . , we obtain
the following result from Theorem 3.2B of Aaberge [5],
Proposition 3.3 Let L1 and L2 be members of L. Then
(i) L1 ith -degree downward dominates L2
implies
(ii) Dk (L1) < Dk (L2) f or k = i, i + 1, i + 2, . . . .
and
F−11 (1)
μ1
<
F−12 (1)
μ2
.
The results of a similar evaluation of the Lorenz family of inequality measures
as that carried out for the extended Gini family are summarized in the following
proposition,
Proposition 3.4 The Lorenz family of inequality measures def ined by (8) has the
following properties,
(i) Dk preserves downward Lorenz dominance of degree k and all degrees lower
than k.
(ii) Dk obeys the Pigou–Dalton principle of transfers for k > 0, and the principles
of UPTS up to and including (k − 1)th degree for k > 1.
(iii) The sequence {Dk} approaches 0 as k → ∞.
(iv) The sequence {kDk + 1} approaches the relative minimax criterion as k → ∞.
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Proposition 3.1 shows that the various degrees of upward Lorenz dominance are
preserved by sub-families of the extended Gini measures of inequality, which divide
the integer subscript subclass of the extended Gini family into nested subfamilies.
Thus, the hierarchical sequence of nested upward Lorenz dominance criteria offers
a convenient computational method for identifying the largest subfamily of the
extended Gini family of inequality measures that is consistent with the actual ranking
of Lorenz curves. As demonstrated by Proposition 3.3, the various degrees of
downward Lorenz dominance divide the Lorenz family of inequality measures into a
similar sequence of nested subfamilies.
4 Empirical application: income and earnings inequality in Norway, 1967–2005
Below, we combine the dominance and inequality measures approach to examine the
time trend in income and earnings inequality of Norwegian males during the period
1967–2005.
Data Our data are based on administrative registers from Statistics Norway cov-
ering the entire resident population in Norway between 1967 and 2004. The unique
individual identifier allows merging information about individual characteristics, like
age, with data on annual income and earnings taken from tax registers in each year. In
the analysis, we employ two measures of income. First, we use a measure of annual
pre-tax income including all taxable income after deductions.13 Secondly, we use a
measure of earnings including all market income, from wages and self-employment.
Individuals with missing observation on income or earnings are excluded. In each
year 1967–2004, we include the entire population of males aged 20–65 who were
alive and resident in that year. The reason for focusing on males is their role of
breadwinner and primary wage-earners over most of this period.
It should be noted that we in the empirical analysis exclude individuals with
incomes lower than the 1 percentile or higher than the 99 percentile, to minimize
any crossing of Lorenz curves due to measurement error and noise at the tails of
the distributions. Note also that our results do not suffer from sampling errors, since
we have data on the entire population. However, when using sample surveys, it is
necessary to employ relevant statistical tests for evaluating whether the estimated
differences are statistical significant or not. To this end, we refer to the methods
proposed by Aaberge [3, 4], Csörgö et al. [13] and Schechtman et al. [24].
Empirical results Figure 1 reports Gini coefficients for income and earnings, sug-
gesting that Norway has experienced a large increase in inequality since the early
1980s, like most other OECD countries.14 Both income and earnings inequality
decrease in the first period until the early 1980s, bottoming out at a level below
.24. The trends then turn sharply upwards, approaching .32 in the early 1990s. While
13Taxable income includes most cash benefits, but not in-kind benefits. The reason is that we do not
have data on in-kind benefits for the period 1967–2005. See e.g. Aaberge et al. [7] for an analysis of
the distributional impact of in-kind benefits in Norway.
14See Almås et al. [8] for a detailed discussion of the time trend in inequality in Norway, focusing
especially on how changes in the age structure affects inequality.
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Fig. 1 Gini-coefficient in
income and earnings,
1970–2005
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earnings inequality stabilizes over the last decade, income inequality increase further.
A likely reason is the large increase in capital income in the upper part of the income
distribution during this period [6]. It should be noted that the spike in inequality in
the early 1990s was associated with a tax-reform, and that inequality is likely to have
increased more steadily in the absence of this reform (see e.g. [17]). The same is true
for the year 2005, reflecting changes in the tax reporting behavior due to the 2006 tax
reform.
A concern with the above conclusions about the time-trend in inequality is that
they might be sensitive to the choice of inequality measure. To investigate this,
Aaberge [4] advocates using members of Gini’s Nuclear Family, as these inequality
measures have the same theoretical foundation, but supplement each other with re-
gards to sensitivity in different parts of the distribution. For example, the Bonferroni
coefficient is more sensitive to transfers in the lower part of the income distribution,
compared to the Gini coefficients. When applying the Bonferroni coefficient, we
find that it produces a qualitatively different time trend in income and earnings
inequality. For example, the Bonferroni coefficient ranks 1970 as more equal than
1980, in contrast to the ranking produced by the Gini coefficient. Instead of settling
for such inconclusive evidence, we will in Tables 1 and 2 demonstrate how the
methods proposed in this paper can be used to determine the least restrictive
social preferences that are required to reach an unambiguous ranking of the two
distributions.
In Table 1, we report dominance results for the Lorenz curves in income and
earnings for the years 1970, 1980, 1990, and 2005. Panel 1 displays Lorenz dominance
results for earnings, whereas Panel 2 reports Lorenz dominance results for income.
In each panel, the results reported above (below) the diagonal refer to upward
(downward) dominance. And for every dominance result, we first report the year
that dominates and then the order of dominance. To ease the interpretation of the
inequality aversion exhibited in the dominance results, Table 2 computes the weight-
functions of the two different generalized Gini families of inequality measures
according to their relationship to Lorenz dominance of various degrees. Specifically,
Table 2 reports the ratios of the weights of the median individual compared to the 1%
poorest, the 5% poorest, the 30% poorest, the 30% richest, and the 5% richest. We
immediately see that the extended Gini family of inequality measures, Gk defined by
(7), becomes increasingly sensitive to transfers that occur in the lower rather than the
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Table 2 Distributional weight of inequality measures by degree of upward and downward Lorenz
dominance
Upward Lorenz Panel A: Gk
dom. of order k P′1k(.01)/ P
′
1k(.05)/ P
′
1k(.3)/ P
′
1k(.7)/ P
′
1k(.95)/
P′1k(.5) P
′
1k(.5) P
′
1k(.5) P
′
1k(.5) P
′
1k(.5)
k = 1 1.98 1.90 1.40 0.60 0.10
k = 2 3.92 3.61 1.96 0.36 0.01
k = 10 926 613 29 0 0
k = 19 433150 197842 598 0 0
k = 22 3362282 1356998 1640 0 0
Downward Lorenz Panel B: Dk
dom. of order k P′2k(.01)/ P
′
2k(.05)/ P
′
2k(.3)/ P
′
2k(.7)/ P
′
2k(.95)/
P′2k(.5) P
′
2k(.5) P
′
2k(.5) P
′
2k(.5) P
′
2k(.5)
k = 1 1.98 1.90 1.40 0.60 0.10
k = 2 1.33 1.33 1.21 0.68 0.13
k = 7 1.01 1.01 1.01 0.92 0.30
k = 22 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.68
Panel A considers upwards Lorenz dominance, whereas Panel B considers downward Lorenz domi-
nance. In each panel, the first column states the degree of dominance, and columns 2–5 compute the
weight-functions of the generalized Gini families of inequality measures according to their relation-
ship to Lorenz dominance of various degrees. Specifically, column 2 reports the ratio of the weights
of the median individual compared to the 1% poorest, column 3 reports the ratio of the weights
of the median individual compared to the 5% poorest, column 4 reports the ratio of the
weights of the median individual compared to the 30% poorest, column 5 reports the ratio of
the weights of the median individual compared to the 30% richest, and column 6 reports the ratio of
the weights of the median individual compared to the 5% richest. The weight-function P′1k(u) of Gk
is defined in Eq. 11 for j = 1, while the weight function P′2k(u) of Dk is defined in Eq. 13 for j = 1
upper part of the distribution, as k increases. It is also evident that the Lorenz family
of inequality measures, Dk defined by (8), becomes increasingly sensitive to transfers
that occur in the upper rather than the lower part of the distribution, as k increases.
Hence, the choice between upward and downward dominance depends on the extent
to which equalizing transfers between poorer individuals should be considered more
important than those between richer individuals.
Consider first the inequality trend from 1970 and onwards. We see from Table 1
that first degree dominance is sufficient to rank 1970 as more equal than 2000 and
2005, both for earnings and income. As stated above, first-degree dominance implies
that all inequality measures that obey the Pigou–Dalton principle of transfer yield an
unambiguous ranking of these Lorenz curves. However, when considering the years
1980 and 1990, more general dominance criteria are required.
Focusing attention first on upward dominance in earnings, we see that dominance
of second degree is necessary to consistently rank 1970 as more equal than 1990, and
further that dominance of (at least) 22 degree is required to unambiguously rank 1970
as more equal than 1980. From Proposition 3.1 we know that upward dominance of
second degree implies that Gk will consistently rank 1970 as more equal than 1990 for
k greater or equal to 2. And further, that Gk will consistently rank 1970 as more equal
than 1980 for k greater or equal 22. Table 2 shows that the weight-function associated
with G22 implies an extreme degree of downside inequality aversion, whereas G2 is
more sensitive than G22 to income differences in the central and the upper part of the
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distribution. For instance, while G2 assigns about twice as much weight to the 30%
poorest compared to the median individual, G22 weights the former individual 1640
times more than the latter individual. Hence, far more restrictive social preferences
are required to unambiguously rank 1970 and 1980 compared to 1970 and 1990,
according to upward dominance.
Turing attention to downward dominance in earnings, we see that the picture is
reversed: 1970 is actually dominated by 1980 and 1990 of second and seventh degree,
respectively. This illustrates that a consistent ranking of 1970, 1980, and 1990 depends
crucially on the choice between upward and downward dominance criteria, that is,
to what extent concern about inequality is particularly related to inequality in the
lower, the central or the upper part of the distribution. From Proposition 3.3 we
know that downward dominance of second degree implies that Dk will consistently
ranks 1980 as more equal than 1970 for k greater or equal to 2, and 1990 as more
equal than 1970 for k greater or equal to 7. From the weights-functions displayed in
Table 2, we see that D7 exhibits considerably more upside inequality aversion than
D2. Consequently, less restrictive social preferences are required to unambiguously
rank 1970 and 1980 compared to 1970 and 1990 according to downward dominance.
Moving on to the inequality trend for the period 1980–2005, we see that 1980
first-degree dominates 1990, 2000, and 2005 for earnings, Hence, earnings inequality
has unambiguously increased since the 1980. By contrast, downward dominance of
second degree is necessary to consistently rank 1980 as more equal than 1990, 2000
and 2005 in terms of income. And in terms of upward dominance in earnings, 1980 is
actually dominated of (at least) 22 degree by 1990, 2000 and 2005. It is also clear that
1990 first-degree dominates 2000, both for earnings and income. Yet for earnings,
more restrictive social preferences are required to unambiguously rank 1990 and
2005. The same holds true when comparing 2000 and 2005: while 2000 first-degree
dominates 2005 for income, downward dominance of second degree is necessary for
2000 to dominate 2005, and upward dominance of tenth degree is required for 2005
to dominate 2000 in terms of earnings.
5 Conclusion
Because Lorenz curves often intersect, other approaches than first-degree Lorenz
dominance are called for. Although the theoretical literature offers more general
dominance criteria for ranking Lorenz curves, these methods are generally viewed
as hard to implement and the results difficult to interpret because they involve as-
sumptions about third and higher derivatives (see e.g. [10, 11]). Thus, most empirical
studies rely exclusively on one or a few summary measures of inequality to achieve
rankings of intersecting Lorenz curves. A concern is, however, that the conclusions
reached are sensitive to the more or less arbitrary choice of inequality measures. The
purpose of this paper has been to bridge the wide gap between the theoretical and
the empirical strand of the literature concerned with rankings of intersecting Lorenz
curves.
We first arrange the members of generalized Gini families of inequality measures
into subfamilies according to their relationship to Lorenz dominance of various
degrees. Since the various criteria of higher degree Lorenz dominance provide
convenient computational methods, these results can be used to identify the largest
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subfamily of the generalized Gini families and thus the least restrictive social
preferences required to reach unambiguous ranking of a set of Lorenz curves. From
the weight-functions of these inequality measures we obtain intuitive interpretations
of higher degree Lorenz dominance. To demonstrate the usefulness of these methods
for empirical applications, we examine the time trend in income and earnings
inequality of Norwegian males during the period 1967–2005.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 2.1A. The statement (i) implies (ii) follows from Theorem 2.2A
of Aaberge [5].
To prove the converse statement assume that (ii) holds and that L1 and L2 cross
at u = a. Then the following inequalities hold,
a∫
0
(L1(u) − L2(u)) du > 0 (14)
and
1∫
0
(L1(u) − L2(u)) du = 12 (G(L2) − G(L1)) ≥ 0. (15)
Since L1 and L2 cross only once (14) and (15) imply that
u∫
0
(L1(u) − L2(u)) du ≥ 0 for all u ∈ [0, 1]
and the inequality holds strictly for some u ∈ 〈0, 1〉, and the desired result is obtained
by applying Theorem 2.2A of Aaberge [5]. unionsq
Proof of Proposition 2.2. The equivalence between (i) and (ii) follows by noting that
1∫
u
[(1 − L1(t)) − (1 − L2(t))]dt =
1∫
u
(L2(t) − L1(t))dt =
1∫
0
(L2(t) − L1(t))dt +
u∫
0
(L1(t) − L2(t))dt =
u∫
0
(L1(t) − L2(t))dt
when L1 and L2 have equal Gini coefficients. unionsq
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The equivalence between (i) and (iii) and between (ii) and (iv) follows from
Theorems 2.2A and 2.2B of Aaberge [5].
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